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The Spanish labour market presents a high degree of 
duality in relation to the compensation received by 
workers at the end of their employment relationship, 
with low compensation for those under temporary 
contracts of short duration and significantly higher 
compensation for those with permanent contracts and 
many years of service.1 These differences can distort 
firms’ decisions when they need to reduce their 
workforce. In particular, for the same level of productivity, 
workers who have accrued fewer entitlements, owing to 
their accumulated years of service or their contract 
type, tend to bear the brunt of staff reductions since 
they are owed less in severance compensation.2 
Moreover, quite frequently, the accumulation of these 
entitlements to compensation, which workers will only 
receive in the event of dismissal, hampers labour 
mobility, since those leaving their jobs voluntarily lose 
any entitlements accumulated hitherto.
One possibility that has been considered, both in the 
academic literature and in the public debate, to redress 
these shortcomings is the so-called “Austrian fund”.3 
Under this system, firms make monthly contributions to a 
fund in the name of the worker, who is able to use the fund 
in the event of involuntary loss of employment, whether as 
a result of dismissal or contract expiry. In the case of 
voluntary termination, the worker does not lose the 
amount accumulated in the fund and can continue to 
build it up through contributions made by other employers. 
If it has not already been recovered, the entirety of the 
accumulated fund is accessible to the worker upon 
retirement. As a counterpart to firms’ monthly contributions 
to their workers’ individual funds, under this system the 
compensation that firms would have to pay when the 
employment relationship is terminated is reduced.
Fully or partially replacing the current severance cost 
framework with such a system could yield significant 
benefits in the medium and long term.4 First, under this 
system the distribution among workers of the entitlements 
accrued over the course of their working lives would be 
less unequal. This is because all workers, without 
exception, would at some time receive the amounts 
accumulated in their fund, whereas at present only those 
who lose their employment are entitled to such 
compensation. Second, there would be more incentive for 
labour mobility over the course of employees’ working 
lives, since the contributions built up in the fund are not 
lost in the event of voluntary termination, while under the 
current system all entitlements associated with years of 
service are lost when they change job. Third, from the 
standpoint of firms, the fact that the entitlements accrued 
by their workers are recognised gradually, via periodic 
contributions to each employee’s fund, rather than as a 
one-off payment in the event of future dismissal (at a time 
when firms might be in a vulnerable financial position), 
means any liquidity tensions at the company can be 
smoothed over time. Lastly, and associated with the 
above, firms would base their employee termination 
decisions more on productivity and efficiency 
considerations and less than on the compensation 
entitlements accumulated by their workers, since the 
amounts payable by the firm at the time of dismissal 
would be less closely associated with those entitlements. 
However, despite these potential medium and long-term 
benefits, the introduction of such a model is not without 
certain difficulties. The first relates to determining a 
sufficient level of protection against dismissal when the 
new system is fully operational for all workers. A second 
important matter, connected with the above, concerns the 
transition from the existing model to a new system based 
on such a mechanism. In particular, introducing the new 
system poses the challenge of recognising the 
compensation entitlements built up hitherto by current 
workers under the existing arrangements (and therefore 
not paid into an individual fund).
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1  By way of example, according to estimates based on the Continuous Sample of Working Histories (MCVL by its Spanish acronym), between 2013 
and 2016 10% of workers receiving compensation at the end of their employment relationship collected €23 or less, while the 10% of workers who 
received the highest compensation collected €6,400 or more.
2  For more information on the evidence relating to the impact of Spain’s labour market duality on hiring and firing decisions, see Box 6, “Job creation 
and destruction flows by type of contract during the recovery”, Economic Bulletin, 1/2019, Banco de España.
3  The fund takes its name from the severance pay reform introduced in Austria in 2002, which replaced the compensation payable by firms to workers 
at the end of their employment relationship with a system under which firms made monthly contributions to an account in the worker’s name equivalent 
to a specific percentage of their wage.
4  See, among other studies, J. I. Conde-Ruiz, F. Felgueroso and J.I. García-Pérez “El fondo de capitalización a la austríaca: costes y beneficios de su 
implantación en España”, Estudios Económicos 6/2011, FEDEA, 2011. The role of an Austrian fund as a complement to retirement pensions, with 
favourable effects on the stock of capital in the economy and aggregate output, was recently analysed by J. Brogueira de Sousa, J. Díaz-Saavedra 
and R. Marimon, “Introducing an Austrian Backpack in Spain”, ADEMU WP Series 139, 2018.
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The simulation below offers a quantitative illustration of 
the two above challenges in the recent context of the 
Spanish labour market.  For this purpose, a hypothetical 
scenario is constructed under which an Austrian fund 
model is introduced – with firms making periodic 
contributions in the name of each of their workers – based 
on two assumptions. First, it is assumed that this model is 
introduced alongside a reform of severance costs, 
whereby, in the long run – once all workers are included in 
the new system – there is no reduction in the aggregate 
amounts paid to workers should they lose their 
employment, nor cost overruns for firms or public 
finances. Second, it is assumed that all entitlements 
accumulated under the previous model up until the 
introduction of the new system are maintained. The short-
term costs of introducing this system – as a consequence 
of recognising the compensation entitlements already 
accrued by existing workers – are estimated on the basis 
of these two assumptions (under any realistic scenario, 
these assumptions would evidently be matters to be 
decided by social and economic agents and politicians).
Regarding the first of the above assumptions, on the 
information provided by the Panel of Data on Firms and 
Workers (PET by its Spanish acronym), available for the 
period 2013-2016, if firms’ contributions to workers’ 
individual funds are equivalent to six days of pay per year 
of service and the severance and termination costs for 
existing contracts are reduced by 50%,5 in the long-term 
the total costs paid by firms – including both the regular 
contributions to individual funds and the new severance 
payments – would be very similar to the total severance 
payments that firms would pay under the current model 
(see Table 1, columns 1 and 2).6
SOURCES: Banco de España, based on data from the Social Security General Treasury (Panel of Data on Firms and Workers, 2013-2016).
a The total costs paid by firms under the mixed system during the transition are based on the assumption that the reform of severance costs is 
introduced on 1 January 2013. For workers registered prior to that date, the firm would have to pay the severance costs under the current system 
corresponding to the accumulated years of service up to 1 January 2013, plus the severance costs under the reform (half) for the years of service 
accumulated between 1 January 2013 and the date of termination.
b Note that column (3) corresponds to the sum of columns (4), (5) and (7).
c The firms’ contributions to individual funds are equivalent to one day of pay per year of service in 2013, two days in 2014, three days in 2015 and 
four days in 2016.
d The State’s contributions are equivalent to five days of pay per year of service in 2013, four days in 2014, three days in 2015 and two days in 2016.
e The estimated costs for the period 2013-2016 do not exactly match the sum of the costs estimated for each year. This is because the estimate 
for the period 2013-2016 uses the mode of each firm’s size throughout the period as population weight, while for the annual estimate each firm’s size 





to individual funds 
(c)
Total
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) = (4) + (5) (7)
2013 7,236 6,832 9,868 6,653 536 7,189 2,679
2014 6,809 6,810 9,057 5,651 1,135 6,786 2,270
2015 7,242 7,194 9,267 5,694 1,786 7,481 1,786
2016 6,501 7,044 8,560 4,767 2,529 7,296 1,264
Total period 
2013-2016 (e) 27,998 28,010 37,093 23,082 5,979 29,062 8,031
State contribution
to individual funds in 
the transition to the 
mixed system, with the 
support mechanism (d)
Total costs paid by 
firms under the 
current system
Total theoretical 
costs that firms 
would pay under 
the mixed system
in the long term
Total costs paid by
firms under the 
mixed system




Total costs paid by firms under the mixed system in the 
transition, with the support mechanism (a)
Table 1 
SIMULATION OF TOTAL COSTS FOR FIRMS OF THE CURRENT SYSTEM OF SEVERANCE COSTS AND OF A MIXED SYSTEM COMBINING AN 
AUSTRIAN FUND AND A REFORM OF SEVERANCE COSTS
5  Equivalent to 16.5 days’ pay per year of service for unfair dismissal, 10 days’ pay per year of service for fair dismissals, and 6 days’ pay per year of 
service for the termination of temporary contracts. The compensation ceilings would remain unchanged.
6  The exercise estimates the severance and termination costs under the current system for the period 2013-2016 and compares them with the same 
costs that would be incurred under the system proposed in this box, combining an Austrian fund with lower severance and termination costs. Under 
both systems, the total figure paid by firms is approximately €28 billion over the four years analysed. It is important to note that a more precise 
calibration of this exercise would need to take into account the average compensation over a complete economic cycle and not only in the period 
2013-2016, but PET data are only available for this specific period.
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To estimate the costs of transitioning to the new model, 
PET data are once again used for the period 2013-2016 
and a hypothetical scenario is assumed under which the 
reform comes into effect on 1 January 2013.7 Under this 
hypothesis, the costs arising from each dismissal or 
termination are simulated, according to cause for 
termination, wage and contract start date, such that the 
compensation entitlements accumulated by workers prior 
to the reform are maintained. This latter circumstance 
gives rise to a cost overrun in respect of the funds needed 
to maintain the system in the long term, once all workers 
are included therein.
Column 3 of Table 1 shows the results of the simulation 
for each year. Specifically, in the transition to the new 
system (in the period 2013-2016) the total cost payable by 
firms – including both contributions to workers’ individual 
funds and severance payments – would be higher by 
approximately €9 billion as compared with the current 
system. To cover this gap, the possibility is considered of 
the State financing a share of the firms’ contributions to 
the new fund, albeit only in the short term and in a 
decreasing amount over time: five days’ pay per year of 
service in the first year after the reform, four days’ pay in 
the second year, and so on, such that firms would fully 
cover the payments to the fund six years after the approval 
of the reform. 
Columns 4 and 5 of Table 1 show the amounts payable by 
firms as severance pay and the contributions to workers’ 
individual funds, respectively. As can be seen, the total of 
these amounts for the overall period analysed (column 6) 
is very similar to that in column 1, which is the amount 
payable under the current system. Meanwhile, column 7 
of Table 1 shows the cost of this transition mechanism to 
the State. In line with the design of the mechanism, that 
cost would gradually decline each year and would amount 
to approximately €8 billion during the period 2013-2016. 
Extrapolating those amounts to 2017,8 the final year of the 
proposed transition period, the total cost to public 
finances of funding the transition would be approximately 
€8,660 million. These costs could be financed, at least in 
part, using the NGEU funds. Indeed, the European 
Commission’s regulation states that the reforms eligible 
for such funds must help bolster growth and enhance 
economic or environmental sustainability, and cites 
pension system and labour market reforms as specific 
examples.9
It is worth emphasising that this quantitative illustration 
of the possible requirements entailed in implementing a 
system based on the Austrian fund in Spain has some 
limitations which should be taken into account when 
interpreting the above results. First, the analysis is static, 
in that it does not consider the possibility of firms and 
workers changing their labour decisions in response to 
the introduction of the proposed new system. This is 
indeed unrealistic. Firms might be more inclined to lay off 
workers since the marginal cost of making that decision 
would be reduced by half, and those lay-offs would be 
less concentrated among the workers with the fewest 
years of service. In view of this possibility and to 
strengthen the incentives for firms to internalise the costs 
arising from the termination of their employment 
relationships (both in terms of the worker’s circumstances 
and spending on unemployment benefits), consideration 
could be given to introducing a bonus-malus system, 
under which firms with lower labour turnover pay lower 
Social Security contributions, and vice versa. Meanwhile, 
labour mobility would foreseeably increase since workers 
would be less reluctant to lose their accrued entitlements 
and less afraid of being the first to be laid off when they 
move to a new company. This increase in voluntary 
mobility would allow workers to find a better job match 
for their skills, with the concomitant aggregate benefit for 
the economy.10
Second, the data available in the PET restricts the period 
of analysis to the years from 2013 to 2016, which was a 
period of economic recovery. It should therefore be taken 
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 7  Lay-offs with a contract start date after 1 January 2013 receive half of the compensation envisaged under the current system (16.5, 10 or 6 days’ 
pay per year of service, depending on the cause of termination), while lay-offs whose contract began before that date receive the amounts established 
under the current system duly adjusted for the proportion of time worked prior to and after the reform. From 1 January 2013 onwards, all workers 
receive the contributions made to the Austrian fund.
 8  The total cost of the Austrian fund is relatively constant over the years considered. Therefore, bearing in mind that in 2017 the State would pay one 
day’s contribution as opposed to two in 2016, the cost in 2017 would be approximately half the €1,264 million paid in 2016.
 9  See “Commission Staff Working Document. Guidance to Member States Recovery and Resilience Plans”, SWD 205 final, European Commission, 
2020.
10  See, for example, A. Kettemann, F. Kramarz and J. Zweimüller, “Job Mobility and Creative Destruction: Flexicurity in the Land of Schumpeter”, 
Working Paper No 256, Department of Economics, University of Zurich, 2017.
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into account that the exact calibration of the parameters 
of the above simulation could change if a longer period 
combining different cyclical phases is considered.11 
Consequently, the quantifications presented here should 
be interpreted with due caution.
Lastly, under the calibration used in the simulation, the 
aggregate amounts earmarked for employment protection 
would remain unchanged in the long term. However, their 
distribution would be altered, such that the reform would 
benefit some types of firms and workers and disadvantage 
other groups relative to the current situation.12 Specifically, 
the new system could be relatively beneficial for firms with 
a high number of lay-offs. Therefore, as has been 
indicated, it might be appropriate to complement the new 
system with a bonus-malus arrangement to mitigate this 
bias. From the standpoint of workers, the new system 
would particularly benefit those laid off after few years of 
service and workers changing job voluntarily. The detailed 
study of these redistributive effects and of the policies 
that could be deployed to mitigate them should be subject 
to in-depth analysis in future.
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11  In principle, the MCVL could be used to produce a more precise calibration. However, in this sample, the information on the causes of employment 
termination prior to 2013 is inadequate, particularly for temporary workers, since terminations by contract expiry cannot be distinguished from other 
causes. Assuming that all involuntary terminations of temporary contracts are due to contract expiry (which have been the majority since 2013), the 
total compensation paid under the proposed reform in the period 2000-2019 would be very similar (0.2% lower) to that under the current system, 
while the distribution over time would be less concentrated in periods of recession.
12  See A. Hijzen and A. Salvatori, “Introducing individual savings accounts for severance pay in Spain: An ex-ante assessment of the distributional 
effects”, OECD Social, Employment and Migration Working Papers, No 259, OECD Publishing, Paris, 2021.
